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Abstract 
One of the most serious challenges (if not the most serious challenge) for interactive psycho-physical dualism 
(henceforth interactive dualism or ID) is the so-called ‘interaction problem’. It has two facets, one of which this 
article focuses on, namely the apparent tension between interactions of non-physical minds in the physical world 
and physical laws of nature. One family of approaches to alleviate or even dissolve this tension is based on a 
collapse solution (‘consciousness collapse/CC) of the measurement problem in quantum mechanics (QM). The 
idea is that the mind brings about the collapse of a superposed wave function onto one of its eigenstates. Thus, it 
is claimed, can the mind change the course of things without violating any law figuring in physical theory.  
 
I will first show that this hope is premature because energy and momentum are probably not conserved in collapse 
processes, and that even if this can be dealt with, the violations are either severe or produce further ontological 
problems. Second, I point out several conceptual difficulties for interactionist CC. I will also present solutions for 
those problems, but it will become clear that those solutions come at a high cost. Third, I shall briefly list some 
empirical problems which make life even harder for interactionist CC. I conclude with remarks about why no-
collapse interpretations of QM don’t help either and what the present study has shown is the real issue for ID: 
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1. Introduction1  
Mind-body-dualism, or sometimes called psycho-physical dualism (hereafter just ‘dualism’) is the view 
that the mind is non-physical and as such of a different ontological nature than the physical body. 
Dualism is certainly the view almost all people standardly hold before coming under the sway of anti-
dualistic doctrines (see for example (Bloom 2004)). In philosophy as in science, dualism has for many 
decades been frowned upon, but in the last 30-40 years it made a strong comeback with many 
sophisticated philosophical2 as well as scientific3 defenses.  
 
Dualism comes in two main varieties: substance dualism (SD) and property dualism (PD). Substance 
dualism maintains that there are purely mental, non-physical substances (most notably human or animal 
minds/souls), while property dualism contents itself with claiming that some things (substances or not) 
have mental properties besides their physical properties, and that those mental properties are in no way 
reducible to physical properties; in other words, that they are part of the basic property furniture of the 
world. Both SD and PD can be defended as interactive or non-interactive varieties. By ‘interactive’ I 
mean the thesis that the mind has the power to causally influence the physical world in such a way that 
the course of things is different than it would otherwise have been, along the lines of the slogan “Had 
the mind not interacted, physical event e would (not) have happened”. There are also non-interactionist 
versions of dualism. One is Leibniz’s ‘pre-established harmony’, where the physical and mental worlds 
run parallel but do not causally affect each other; it is God who established a perfect harmony between 
the two in terms of a correlation (as opposed to causation). Another example is epiphenomenalism, 
where the mind is also causally impotent; causal activity belongs to physical structures only, and while 
the mind does register what is going on in the physical world (i.e. there is physical-to-mental causation), 
it cannot interfere with it (no mental-to-physical causation). I hope this suffices to make clear what I 
mean by ‘interactive dualism’ (ID). It is ID only that this article deals with. 
 
There are a number of objections against both PD and SD (with the bulk against SD). The presumably 
most serious one, however, is directed against the interactive versions of PD and SD: the so-called 
interaction problem. The interaction problem has two facets. One takes issue with the mere idea that 
something non-physical influences the physical world (sometimes called the ‘causal nexus problem’). I 
shall focus on the other facet, which we might call the ‘laws of nature problem’. Whatever you think of 
laws of nature, no one denies that there are regularities in nature which we call ‘laws of nature’: positive 
and negative charges attract (and do not repel) each other, apples fall to the ground (and do not rise into 
 
1 I am grateful to Michael Esfeld, Dustin Lazarovici, Kenneth Augustyn and Brian Pitts for fruitful exchange and 
consultation and to the John Templeton Foundation for enabling me to visit the summer school “Paradoxes in 
Quantum Mechanics” of the John Bell Institute on Hvar, Croatia.  
2 See e.g. (Swinburne 1996; 2013; 2019; Loose, Menuge, and Moreland 2018; Taliaferro 1994; Goetz and 
Taliaferro 2011; Baker and Goetz 2011) 
3 Averill and Keating 1981; Popper and Eccles 1977; Eccles 1986; Beck and Eccles 1992; Collins 2008; 2011a; 
2011b; Cucu and Pitts 2019 
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the sky), energy and momentum are conserved. Now, by above definition of ID, the mind would make 
it the case that some of those laws fail in some instances (presumably in the brain, on a submicroscopic 
scale, but that makes no difference to the point). The concrete objection depends on the type of law that 
the detractor of dualism thinks is violated.  
 
2. How QM is supposed to facilitate mental interaction 
What does quantum mechanics (QM) have to do with all this? The starting point is the collapse view of 
measurement processes in QM. Suppose an electron in a superposition of spin +½ / -½ in a certain 
direction (say, x-direction) is measured. Quantum formalism as well as empirical investigations show 
that the outcomes of spin +½ and -½ occur with a probability of 50 % each; there is simply no predicting 
what the outcome in the next measurement will be, just that probability. The standard view in QM is 
that this happens due to a ‘collapse of the wave function’: prior to the measurement, the Schrödinger 
wave function of the electron is in a superposition of spin +½ / -½, and the measurement somehow 
brings about a ‘collapse’ to one sharp spike, i.e. one of the possible eigenstates with the corresponding 
value +½ or -½.  
 
Quantum theory is not restricted to the quantity of spin. Position and momentum are other quantities (in 
QM jargon: observables) of which a quantum system can be in a superposition of. In fact, every definite 
state (eigenstate) of the position observable is a superposition of the momentum states, and vice versa. 
The famous Heisenberg uncertainty relation quantitatively links momentum and position in such a way 
that the more exact the measurement of one of them is, the more uncertain the value of the other will 
be, and that there is a lower bound of the product of position and momentum uncertainty4: ∆𝑥∆𝑝 ≥ ℏ2 
The idea is now that the mind, if it could influence spin, momentum or position (or some other 
observable) within the given constraints, then it could make a difference in the physical world without 
violating any regularity, simply because there is merely a probabilistic (as opposed to a determinate) 
answer to the counterfactual question “What would have happened had the mind not interacted?” (We 
will see later on that the probabilistic occurrence of the outcomes poses problems for QM-aided ID). 
For example, if a certain particle in the brain (or a brain area) were in a superposition of several position 
states, and if the mind could bring about a state reduction (‘collapse’) to one of those positions, then it 
could influence brain processes, provided the submicroscopic change results in a macroscopic effect. 
(We will see in due course that none of those antecedents is without difficulties). An important corollary 
 
4 The ontological status of the uncertainties is unclear. Some think that it’s just a lower bound on the statistical 
standard deviations of position and momentum measurements (making it an epistemic matter), while others hold 
that there is as a matter of fact no definite pre-measurement value (making it an ontological matter) (e.g. (Bricmont 
2016, 42-44). Bricmont’s position seems more conclusive to me, since he offers the ‘no hidden variables theorem’ 
(which he also proves) in its support. For the rest of this article, I will assume genuine indeterminacy (as opposed 
to mere epistemic indeterminacy) for the observable-dyad of position and momentum. 
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of this mind-induced state-reduction is – or so it is hoped – that conservation of energy and/or 
momentum is respected, again because momentum (and thereby energy) may have a range of possible 
values prior to state reduction.  
 
At any rate, we can sum up the view just described as ‘sometimes-consciousness collapse’ (‘sometimes-
CC’): the idea that the conscious mind sometimes collapses (state-reduces) quantum superpositions in 
the brain, namely where and when it wills a bodily action (or perhaps a purely mental action such as 
directing one’s attention to something).  
 
However, the theory that’s been around for much longer is what I call ‘always-CC’. ‘Always-CC’ 
expands mental influence to all quantum objects. In fact, it is one of the earliest interpretations of QM. 
John von Neumann (1932) first pointed out that the strict application of the quantum formalism entails 
that conscious observers end up in a superposed, indeterminate state when observing a superposed 
quantum object; but no conscious observer ever seems to have experienced such a state of ‘superposed 
phenomenal experience5’. This dilemma is the so-called measurement problem. Eugene Wigner (1967) 
took up Von Neumann’s thread and claimed that it is our non-physical consciousness (note: I shall 
henceforth use ‘mind’ and ‘consciousness’ interchangeably) that brings about the state reduction (= 
collapse). Let us call this view ‘always-CC’, since it claims that whenever a state reduction takes place, 
it was a non-physical mind that brought it about.  
It is important to note that always-CC is designed to explain phenomenal experiences, not actions. But 
of course, if always-CC is correct, then actions are no less caused by the state-reducing influence of 
mind than phenomenal experiences, on the plausible assumption that the physical structures involved in 
action (most notably the brain) are subject to the laws of QM. If true, always-CC would constitute a 
deep connection between mind and matter. In fact, defenders of always-CC claim that QM is at best a 
pragmatic, unsatisfactory piecemeal theory which can only be made complete by incorporating dualistic 
mental influence. However, there are other ways to solve the measurement problem (of which some are 
mentioned briefly in section 6), and that therefore dualists are not limited to always-CC for an account 




5 I speak of ‘phenomenal experience’ rather than of ‘perceptions’, because perception is a success term and should 
be reserved for those instances of phenomenal experience where the experiences forms a perceptual belief.  
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3. No conserved quantities  
Let’s first deal with the hope that a CC theory deflects the objection6 that interactive dualism violates 
conservation laws7. I will show that it is far from clear that CC can do this. 
 
Take the position wavefunction Ψ(x) of a spinless particle, with just one spatial dimension for 
simplicity. It indirectly represents (via |Ψ!(𝑥)|) the probability distribution of the particle being in 
places along the x-axis. This is nothing but a superposition of positions; standard QM has it that it is a 
genuinely ontological matter that the particle is not in one precise place, but just has a certain probability 𝑃(𝑥) of being there (see fig. 1).  
 
Fig. 1: Standing wave for a non-relativistic single particle in a box. The blue curve depicts the real part of the wave function, 
and the red curve the squared wave function, representing the probability density of particle position. This is also illustrated 
by the particle shades below – the more opaque, the higher the probability. (Image adapted from: Maschen / Wikimedia / 
Public Domain)  
Now suppose a collapse of the wave function occurs. Immediately after the collapse, the |Ψ!(𝑥)|) 
(position probability distribution) curve looks like in fig. 2: 
 
Fig. 2: Squared wave function after a position collapse. The particle is perfectly localized, represented by the spike. (Image 
adapted from: Maschen / Wikimedia / Public Domain) 
 
6 The objection is that interactive dualism violates energy(-momentum) conservation and is therefore impossible 
(cf. (Dennett 1991; Westphal 2016; Flanagan 1991; Searle 2004). The objection is almost never stated precisely 
or adequately and can be fended off easily by realizing where conservation laws derive from (Cucu & Pitts 2019). 
7 I comply here to the usual terminology, although it may be that energy and momentum conservation should be 
credited the status of ‘principles’ rather than ‘laws’ (cf. Collins 2008). 
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This means that the position of the particle has now become definite. But via the uncertainty relation, a 
decrease in position uncertainty entails an increase in momentum uncertainty (and, since momentum 
(𝑝 = 𝑚𝑣) and (kinetic) energy (𝑒"#$ = %!𝑚𝑣!) share the same basic quantities, an increase in kinetic 
energy uncertainty).  
 
It is not immediately clear what to make of this. All we’ve established so far is that a collapse increases 
either energy-momentum or position uncertainty. To understand better what a collapse does to energy-
momentum conservation, let us consider a particle in a superposition of energy eigenstates, say 𝑐%|𝐸%⟩ +	𝑐!|𝐸!⟩. The Schrödinger dynamics will conserve the modulus squares |𝑐#|! and thus the (pre-
measurement) expectation value 〈Ψ|𝐻|Ψ〉 = |𝑐%|!𝐸% + |𝑐#|!𝐸!. However, what if a collapse occurs? 
Then, the system will collapse onto either |𝐸%⟩or |𝐸!⟩, and the possible values are 𝐸% or 𝐸!, and energy 
seems not to be conserved.  
 
Several replies are possible. One might hold that the particle had no pre-measurement energy-
momentum value at all. However, this anti-realist view looks more like ‘ostrich tactics’ with the purpose 
of eschewing any ontological commitment. If a plausible scientific realist view can be found, I submit 
that it should be preferred. And indeed, there are at least three. First, one might assume that the system 
had either 𝐸% or 𝐸! all along, and that the measurement just brought forward the true value. The problem 
is that such definite pre-measurement values seem to be excluded by the no-hidden-variables theorem 
(see fn. 3), which is why I already rejected this assumption. Second, it might be held that conservation 
laws apply to closed systems only, and since a measurement entails that the measured system isn’t closed 
any longer, energy conservation need not hold for that system. But of course, open systems exchange 
energy with their environment, and energy conservation can be formulated via the energy density in- 
and outflux across the system’s borders (see Pitts 2020). Hence, energy conservation does hold, and 
there must be a matter of fact as to where energy came from (or went) if a measurement changes the 
energy state of a system. A third possibility is to claim that energy is conserved on the ‘ensemble’ level. 
The idea is that if one measured a large number of identically prepared systems, one would get as a 
mean value (at least approximately) |𝑐%|!𝐸% + |𝑐#|!𝐸!, which corresponds to the expectation value 〈Ψ|𝐻|Ψ〉.	 
 
In the following, I shall work with the third understanding of energy conservation in quantum systems. 
Gao (2017) offers an account along those lines. According to it, energy is conserved at the ‘ensemble’ 
level, i.e. at the level of an ensemble of identically prepared systems. Such conservation obtains if “the 
probability distribution of energy eigenvalues [manifests] itself through the collapse results for an 
ensemble of identically prepared systems. This means that the diagonal density matrix elements for the 
ensemble should be precisely the same as the initial probability distribution at every step of the 
evolution” (Gao 2017, 136); in other words, if no quantum information is lost throughout evolution and 
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collapse. However, in Gao’s theory, the collapses and their frequency are explained wholly physically, 
without any recourse to minds. Does mind-induced collapse conserve energy at the ensemble level? 
  
To answer this question, it is helpful to examine another mind-independent collapse theory, the GRW8 
theory. Roughly, on GRW, wave function collapses occur stochastically; also, the particle localization 
is ‘imperfect’ (the position spike still has a certain width around a collapse center) and obeys a Gaussian 
distribution (concerning the position of the collapse center). What is clear is that collapses in GRW do 
not conserve energy-momentum at the ensemble level. This is primarily because energy superpositions 
do not collapse to eigenstates. Now, is CC more akin to GRW or to Gao’s account? This is not clear. It 
might be that consciousness-induced collapses conserve energy-momentum at the ensemble level, 
although this is would be an additional constraint to mental action besides the Born rule. It might also 
be that the collapses are more of a GRW type (i.e., failing to conserve energy at the ensemble level) and 
thus plausibly preserve complete freedom for mental interaction. Therefore, on the understanding of 
energy conservation endorsed here, we seemingly have reached a dilemma that can only be solved 
through a trade-off: either sacrifice complete freedom of action or energy-momentum conservation. Of 
course, this dilemma might not arise if one of the other understandings of quantum energy conservation 
are true. 
 
At the same time, we probably need not worry about any such dilemma, or even if there indeed is one, 
I urge that we can solve it by going for the latter option: accept violations of conservation laws. Energy-
momentum conservation is not as sacrosanct as philosophers tend to think. The physics community 
doesn’t seem to have a problem with GRW because of failures of conservation principles9 – implying 
that physical theory can accommodate theories which violate those principles –, so it might as well 
accept another conservation-violating collapse theory. Support comes from the fact that physical theory 
construes conservation principles as conditional statements rather than as unconditional ones, at least 
for Lagrangian theories in classical physics, but apparently also in quantum mechanics10. The 
conditionality is constituted by the Noether theorems (Noether 1918; Goldstein 1980, ch. 12-7): iff a 
system possesses continuous space (time) translational symmetry, then there is momentum (energy) 
conservation, and vice versa. This implies that failure of conservation can simply occur if the antecedent 
of the conditional statement is not satisfied – period. In fact, it is accepted that energy-momentum 
conservation in Noether’s sense can be violated if space translation is not homogenous (as is the case in 
 
8 Acronym referring to its founders, the Italian physicists Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber. 
9 A serious worry, though, is that the parameters of the ‘spontaneous collapses’ in GRW need to be within certain 
confines in order to not lead to too much energy gain and thus to ‘global warming’ (see also (Feldmann and 
Tumulka 2012)). At any rate, there does not seem to be an in-principle problem for physicists if energy/momentum 
conservation didn’t hold in spontaneous collapses. 
10 Quantum field theory books often start with Noether's theorem, which suggests that the relation between 
symmetries and conservation laws is both largely true and important in quantum field theory. Also, in Feynman 




concepts in General Relativity). With this ‘conditionality response’ (Pitts 2020; Cucu and Pitts 2019) 
the dualist can fend off any objection specifically targeting energy-momentum conservation). 
 
However, this won’t in general please physicists, for they will presumably be worried about a deeper 
point, namely the regularity of nature and the status of laws of nature. After all, if the temporal and 
spatial symmetry of nature – in other words, the principle that the laws ‘governing’ the behavior of 
physical objects are the same in all places and at all times – fails in some places and at some times, what 
of the idea of laws in general? And even if it can be made plausible that in the vast majority of times 
and places the laws hold (and fail only very seldom), what of the idea of ‘laws of nature’? What law of 
nature could possibly accommodate such, even though infrequent, capricious behavior? In fact, there 
are answers to this question, but a treatment goes beyond the scope of this paper. At this point, it has to 
be acknowledged that the concept of laws of nature poses a prima facie problem for ID. GRW, by 
contrast, is in far less trouble with respect to laws of nature. Here is why: the GRW theorist has two 
options for integrating his theory into a regularity view of laws of nature. The first is to say that 
spontaneous collapses just happen, with a certain probability, and that this is simply a law of nature, 
primitive and not further explainable. The second option is to claim that the spontaneous collapses can 
be explained by a deeper, undiscovered law of nature. An interactive dualist, however, cannot make 
either of those moves, at least if he wishes to grant the mind independent causal powers (more on that 
later).  
 
Another defense of the failure of QM-aided ID in respecting conservation principles is that although 
violations happen, they are too gentle to be detected. This could be the case if consciousness-collapses 
reduce the wave function in a ‘smooth’ GRW manner (in GRW the parameter of post-collapse peak 
width is chosen so as to not generate empirically disconfirmed ‘global heating’). Thus, we may gain the 
impression that brains perfectly comply to the laws of nature, although, undetectable by us, non-physical 
minds cause irregular behavior. This may yet be the case (in fact I believe it to be so), but it completely 
misses the point: in dealing with failures of conservation principles/laws of nature, we deal with an 
ontological question, not an epistemological one. If conservation failures occur, no matter how small, 
the law-based argument against ID takes off, and the dualist needs to defend his position at the level of 
laws of nature in general, not at the level of specific conservation principles. It should also be noted that 
a GRW-type collapse leaves ‘tails’ in the wave function which create theoretical and philosophical 
problems (cf. (McQueen 2015)). 
 
In summary, the interactive dualist’s hope that mental interaction through CC conserves energy-
momentum stands on shaky ground. A possible solution would be to construe quantum energy 
conservation to hold at the ensemble level (perhaps along the lines of Gao’s theory), but this might entail 
a significant restriction of the freedom of mental interaction. Either way, ID needs to address the issue 
of natural laws, even though it is equally clear that the specific principles (or ‘laws’ if you wish) of 
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momentum and energy conservation pose no threat to it. Thus, one important motivation for seeking a 
QM-aided account of ID is considerably weakened.  
4. Conceptual problems for CC 
In this section, I argue that sometimes-CC as well as always-CC suffer from conceptual difficulties, that 
is, problems concerning the internal coherence of the theory. Empirical problems will be addressed in 
the next section. The conceptual problems apply to sometimes-CC as well as to always-CC, though of 
course our interest focusses on interactive sometimes-CC. 
 
4.1 CC is mysterious 
One objection often raised by physicists is that ‘consciousness’ cannot be part of a physical theory, and 
hence contributes nothing to the elucidation of the physical processes underlying a measurement. On 
the one hand, if consciousness is, as proponents of CC claim, ex hypothesi non-physical, it cannot find 
a place in physical theory. On the other hand, even if consciousness is somehow linked to physical 
systems, for example to a supervenience basis, then it is still problematic to make it part of quantum 
theory, because its connection to the physical basis is at best very poorly understood. Therefore, the 
complaint goes, stipulating consciousness as the cause for wave function collapse verges on 
mysteriousness. 
 
4.2 Problems posed by the Quantum Zeno Effect 
4.2.1 Making CC accessible for physical theory 
 
In order to fend off the mysteriousness objection, more needs to be said about how the mind ‘measures’ 
quantum objects (measurement being the process that leads to wave function collapse). In particular, 
one needs to link non-physical consciousness to brain structures in such a way that it becomes available 
for physical theory. The best way to do this I can think of is via a physical correlate of consciousness11 
(PCC). For a PCC we need assume no more than a systematic correlation between physical states of the 
brain and conscious states. In particular, no commitment to any metaphysical view about the relation of 
mind and brain12 is required. However, it is important that the correlation reflects a genuine dependence 
of mental (conscious) states on brain states. Otherwise, it seems difficult to speak of a PCC in the sense 
relevant here, for then any given neural state might be instantiated without consciousness. The 
systematicity (which does not preclude multiple realizability!) also seems crucial to enable us to cast 
consciousness collapse as a rigorous theory (as it seems there can be no scientific theory without some 
degree of systematicity in the correlation of two parameters).  
 
11 The bulk of the literature deals with neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). PCC include NCC and thus 
have the advantage of keeping the search for correlates of consciousness more open. 
12 The three most important ones being supervenience, grounding, and emergence (identity is, of course, out of 
the question for dualists). 
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What exactly is a PCC? I shall use David Chalmers’s (2000) definition in an adapted way13: 
 
A PCC (for content) is a minimal physical representational system P such that representation of a 
content in P is sufficient, under conditions C, for representation of that content in consciousness.  
 
The addition ‘for content’ is important, because we are not interested in a correlate for the general 
property of being conscious (as opposed to being in a coma, for example), but in a correlate for certain 
contents of consciousness (in this case, volitions). What is meant by ‘representation’? If I see an apple, 
the content is ‘apple’. Neural activities appropriately correlated with my seeing-an-apple are a physical 
representation of that content, and of course my experience of an apple is a conscious representation of 
the apple. It should also be noted that above definition suspends judgment on causal relations. It does 
not say that a certain representation of a content in P causes a representation of that content in 
consciousness (or the other way around), but it certainly leaves that possibility open.  
 
What could P be? It could in principle be a certain anatomical brain area, but it might also be 40-hertz 
oscillations in the cerebral cortex (Crick and Koch 1990) or a field generated by the brain (Libet 1994). 
Of course, different proposals pertain to different aspects of consciousness, so not all of them will be 
equally viable for our purposes here. However, I am not concerned with those details here; all we need 
is a candidate for P which allows CC to be formulated more rigorously. 
 
The next question we need to tackle is to which extent the content of P is mapped onto the content of 
consciousness. In particular, will a superposed P be mapped onto a superposed consciousness (modulo 
consciousness-caused collapse)? If it does, a CC theory must find an explanation why consciousness in 
fact never seems to be superposed. If it fails to do so, the whole project should be dropped and we are 
back with the ‘mysteriousness’ objection. I shall assume that the aforementioned correlation does hold. 
Without having too much space to argue for this, here is why: in order to make the role of consciousness 
accessible for physical theory, we need to claim a strict (though perhaps multiply realizable) correlation 
of P-states with consciousness states. The physical collapse will then be caused by a property of P (or P 
tout court, if P is the collapse-causing property, see below) which is strictly mapped onto some property 
of consciousness (both of which, as we will see, must at least statistically resist superposition). But then 
some P-properties (or P itself), if they can enter superposition at all (due to their being physical 
properties), will, when in superposition, correlate with consciousness properties (or consciousness tout 
court) in superposition, due to the strict mapping.  
 
Thus, we can sum up the relation between states of P and states of consciousness as follows: 
 
13 Chalmers focused on neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) in the cited article. I replaced ‘NCC’ by ‘PCC’ 
and ‘neural’ by ‘physical’.  
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superposed P → superposed consciousness14 
and 
definite P → definite consciousness 
 
4.2.2 CC and the m-property framework 
Let me next clarify the interplay between measurements and the evolution of undisturbed quantum 
objects. Measurement in the language of QM is what leads to definite states (and results). In terms of a 
wave function diagram, a measurement turns the extended ‘hill(s) and valley(s)’ of a wave function into 
one sharp peak (at least in case of a collapse onto an eigenstate, which I shall assume here). Such a 
process (if it indeed takes place) is a disruption of the temporal evolution of the wave function dictated 
by the dynamical Schrödinger equation.  
It is important to note that the Schrödinger dynamics is deterministic (not probabilistic!) and unitary 
(roughly, it preserves all the information contained in the wave function across time). The collapse, by 
contrast, is non-unitary, i.e. it ‘destroys’ most of the information contained in the wave function prior 
to the collapse, by reducing the multitude of possible values contained in the wave function 
(corresponding to a superposition of states) to just one. After a collapse, the Schrödinger dynamics again 
determines the evolution of the wave function, until the next measurement/collapse. 
 
Spelling out a physically viable theory of CC requires an explanation of how the mind ‘measures’ 
superposed brain structures. The most elaborate approach I know of is the one by David Chalmers and 
Kelvin McQueen15. They propose the existence of ‘m-(measurement-)properties’. An ‘m-property’ (or 
‘m-observable’ or ‘m-quantity’) is characterized as follows: 
 
• There can be no superposition of an m-property => a system’s wave function is always in an 
eigenstate of the operator of this property 
• Whenever an m-property is about to enter a superposition (via entanglement with a superposable 
property of another physical system), it collapses to definiteness 
• The probabilities of the collapse are given by the Born rule for the associated m-operator 
 
In the framework used here, an m-property must of course be a property of a PCC; in fact, as I understand 
Chalmers and McQueen, the m-property is a the PCC. Which properties might be m-properties? In 
principle, any physical or mathematical property is a candidate. There are at least two constraints, 
however: (1) an m-property must not be too common, so that there is room for superpositions (otherwise 
collapses could not occur); (2) an m-property must not be too rare, so that measurements (which always 
 
14 The arrows signify entailment. 
15 I refer to drafts available on the internet (Chalmers and McQueen 2014 - draft planned for an anthology that is 
due 2020); an overview of the different drafts can be found on http://consc.net/qm/ (accessed 2020/04/30)). 
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yield definite results) always involve m-properties. Constraint (1) rules out at least position, mass or 
very common atoms or molecules. Constraint (2) suggests that m-properties must be present in brains.  
For now, just to get an idea how m-properties work, let me briefly present an illustrative toy model. 
Suppose an m-property has two eigenstates, |𝑚%⟩ and |𝑚!⟩	with eigenvalues 𝜇% and 𝜇!, respectively, 
and that the structure possessing the m-property is in state |𝑚%⟩.	Suppose further that a particle in a 
superposition (of observable 𝑝) of 𝜋%|𝑝%⟩	and 𝜋!|𝑝!⟩	gets entangled with our m-system. The (fictitious) 
superposition 
 |Ψ⟩ = 	𝜇%|𝑚%⟩	𝜋%|𝑝%⟩ 	+	𝜇!|𝑚!⟩	𝜋!|𝑝!⟩ 
 
results, which will in fact not occur. Rather, there will be an instantaneous collapse onto either |𝑚%⟩|𝑝%⟩ 
or |𝑚!⟩|𝑝!⟩.  
 
4.2.3 CC and the Quantum Zeno effect 
The main problem for the m-property theory stems from the application of the so-called Quantum Zeno 
Effect (QZE) to m-properties. The QZE roughly consists in quantum systems becoming ‘frozen’ in one 
state if they’re being measured in very rapid succession16. Some have thought the QZE conducive to 
interactive dualism, arguing that the mind could, through a fusillade of measurements, hold certain brain 
structures – which would otherwise ‘smear out’ according to the Schrödinger dynamics – in one definite 
state and thus trigger actions (Henry Stapp is perhaps the most famous proponent of this theory, see a.o. 
his 2017).  
 
Alas, it is not so easy. Remember that an m-property cannot enter superpositions of its values. This 
means that by itself it cannot evolve, at least if we take the Schrödinger evolution as a basis (which 
requires constant, though changing, superposition). And if consciousness is strictly correlated with an 
m-property, then it cannot evolve either, at least not by itself. But this seems unacceptable – surely our 
consciousness constantly evolves, i.e. changes. On the other hand, if we allowed (contra the initial 
hypothesis of m-properties) consciousness to go into superposition, we would get the similarly 
implausible result of a non-definite consciousness.  
 
A first way out of this dilemma could be to stipulate a different physical dynamic for m-properties, one 
that does not entail constant superposition17. Perhaps this is a viable proposal, but I don’t know which 
dynamics could be adequate. I’ll leave the idea for further exploration. 
  
 
16 Rigorous definition of QZE: “If system S is in eigenstate E of some observable O, and measurements of O are 
made N times a second, then, the probability that S will be in E after one second tends to one as N tends to infinity.” 
17 I am indebted to Dustin Lazarovici for this suggestion.  
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Another option is to propose that consciousness can change once it interacts (gets entangled) with other 
physical systems. Via the QZE, the impending superposition would instantly collapse. If it could 
collapse to its initial state only, then we would again get a frozen consciousness. But as my above toy 
example shows, there is no need for the superposition to collapse to the initial eigenstate of the m-
operator; it could as well (with a probability given by the Born rule) collapse onto one of the other 
eigenstates. Thus, we get an evolving consciousness, albeit one that evolves in discrete steps rather than 
continuously. Is this plausible? It depends on two things: (1) whether such a ‘jumpy’ evolution is 
compatible with our first-person conscious experiences; (2) whether the m-property can have enough 
eigenstates.  
(2) should not be a problem. Take the position operator: it might have infinitely many eigenstates (or a 
continuous spectrum of eigenstates) or (if space is discrete) very many eigenstates. This could similarly 
be the case with the m-operator. As to (1), it needs to do justice to our conscious experiences by 
excluding gaps and indefiniteness in the stream of consciousness. The ‘discrete evolution’ theory clearly 
disallows indefiniteness (which is a problem for the ‘approximate m-property’ account, see below). 
Regarding gaps one might argue that, provided the quantum leaps from eigenstate to eigenstate take 
(very little) time, this short intermediate period constitutes a gap.  
It is hard to make an informed judgment about this, since we simply lack background knowledge. 
Comparing the stream of consciousness to a movie is of no help here. We experience a movie as 
continuous (rather than as what it actually is, a rapid succession of pictures) because of limitations of 
our visual system, but more importantly we experience a movie in our consciousness, while it is 
nonsense to say that we experience consciousness itself in consciousness. While we have experiences 
of both continuous-appearing and discrete sequences of pictures, we have no experience of a continuous 
vs. a discrete consciousness. At least it is not obvious that an ontologically discrete stream of 
consciousness is at odds with our experience. Furthermore, there is still the option that the m-operator 
has infinitely many eigenstates (or a continuum thereof), which certainly supports ‘gap-less’ 
consciousness.  
 
McQueen and David Chalmers18 have their own way out of the quantum Zeno dilemma. They call it 
‘approximate m-properties’. The idea is inspired by the GRW theory. An approximate m-property is 
thus a property whose superpositions stochastically collapse (as opposed to always collapse, like in 
absolute m-properties discussed above). Chalmers and McQueen suggest that the collapse frequency 
depends on the size of the superposition; the more superposed the m-property is, the more probable a 
collapse becomes. Their favorite candidate for an m-property is integrated information as it figures in 
Integrated Information Theory (IIT). Simply put, their theory has it that the more integrated information 
(the more consciousness) accumulates in a brain, the more probable a collapse onto a definite state of 
the m-operator (and, by implication, of the physical substrate, and of consciousness) becomes.  
 
 
18 (K. McQueen, n.d.) 
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I must admit that I find the idea of discontinuous consciousness more attractive. On the approximate m-
property approach, there will still be tiny periods of time during which consciousness is superposed and 
hence indefinite. But presumably none of us ever experiences ‘superposed consciousness’. Are the 
superposition periods so short that we don’t experience them? Perhaps, but, again, consciousness is not 
something of which we can be aware but the one thing through which we can become aware of things. 
Therefore, I take it that we could not fail to experience even short superposition periods. On SD, there 
is the additional question whether or how a non-physical mental substance can be superposed. If it 
cannot, this would unduly exclude SD from being a viable position.  
 
Dualists, at least those who are committed to a sufficient ontological independence of mind from 
matter19, can take a completely different route, namely posit a total independence of consciousness 
dynamics from brain dynamics. This ensures complete causal autonomy for the mind, but it is also 
highly implausible – within the framework of CC, nota bene. First, neuroscience has provided ample 
evidence for mind-brain correlations. Plausibly, the evidence so far leaves room for a partly independent 
mind dynamics, especially when it comes to actions. But this option is barred on always-CC, since no 
definite brain state can hold without consciousness. Thus, the dualist who wishes to combine 
independent mind dynamics with CC must take the more radical step towards a complete independence 
of mind from brain. But this is also implausible: suppose the brain goes into superposition, but the mind 
does not (presumably cannot). Can this state of affairs last? If yes, the combination of definite 
consciousness & indefinite brain suggests that having a brain is not a necessary condition for either 
phenomenal experiences or actions. This possibility cannot be dismissed out of hand, perhaps near-death 
experiences (NDE) show that this is possible. But note that in NDE, on a substance dualist reading, 
people leave their bodies. Maybe free-floating souls don’t need brains for phenomenal experiences, but 
embodied souls almost certainly do. If, on the other hand, the divergent state cannot last, it will have to 
be ended by the mind collapsing the brain onto a definite state. But this takes us back to where we 
started, namely to the brute assertion that non-physical minds collapse quantum superpositions, with no 
further elucidation.  
 
4.3 Free actions in danger? 
Let’s take stock what we have seen so far. If a dualist wishes to hold onto CC to explain mental causation 
and make the theory rigorous, he needs to find a way out of the quantum Zeno dilemma. The best option 
here is, in my view, to posit discontinuous ‘measurements’ of the mind via m-properties. This seems 




19 In particular, supervenience and perhaps some grounding relations seem to be excluded, because they tie mind 
dynamics to closely to brain dynamics. 
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There are, however, two big challenges for both accounts.  
The first one is the question of causal efficacy. Does the mind really play a causal role, such that some 
events happen at least partly because of a causal contribution of the mind, or is it just ‘consciousness 
dangling from physics’, where the physics does all the causal work? On PD, causal efficacy is 
guaranteed if the mind/consciousness is identified with the relevant m-property. Since it is (causally) 
because of that property that collapses in the brain occur, one can confidently speak of the mind being 
causally efficacious. On SD, however (as well as on any variant of PD that distinguishes between mind 
and bearer of m-property) things look different. It seems that a combination of such dualism, CC and a 
dependent mind-dynamics entails that the mind is causally impotent. Here’s why: as pointed out, it is 
because of certain states of an m-property (actual or impending superposition) that a collapse occurs. 
On SD, the mind is distinct from the physical basis with its m-property; the mental states merely 
supervene on brain states. Hence, the mind just ‘tracks’ what is going on in the brain, but its causal 
contribution is exactly zero. Causal efficacy for the mind can of course be attained by positing 
independent mind-dynamics (and thereby dissolving supervenience), but we have already seen that this 
leaves us with an unsatisfactorily brute account.  
 
The other question is that of causal independence. By ‘causal independence’ I mean what other authors 
have termed ‘being the ultimate author of one’s actions’ (Moreland and Rae 2000), ‘being the producer 
of one’s actions’ (Hasker 1999) or ‘self-movement’ (Gasser 2015)20. In effect, this is nothing but our 
commonsense conception of free will: I can generate actions/mental events “ex nihilo”21, without being 
caused (deterministically or indeterministically) to do so by anything external (ultimate authorship 
condition), and I can choose between alternative actions/mental events without being externally tied 
down to one of them (alternate possibilities condition22). Now, is the mind, on one of the outlined CC 
theories, causally independent in this sense? We have already seen that this is not possible on a CC/SD 
combination, since on this view the mind is causally inefficacious and a fortiori cannot be causally 
independent. On PD, things are a bit more complicated. At first glance, it might seem that the mind 
cannot be causally independent, for it is the m-property that is doing all the work. But all the m-property 
framework says is that (impending or actual) superpositions collapse to one of the m-eigenstates with a 
probability given by the Born rule. Prima facie this does not prevent the mind from making some causal 
contribution to the direction of the collapses. But now we have to be careful how to spell this out. First, 
it seems to me that we need to distinguish between observation and action. I assume that it is wildly 
implausible to claim that observers somehow ‘choose’ whether an electron goes spin up or spin down, 
 
20 One should think that ‘agent causality’ suffices, but there are many views figuring under that label which clearly 
assign far less causal independence to the agent than I have in mind here (e.g. (R. Clarke 2000; Chisholm 1976; 
Kane 2011)). 
21 I chose this strong expression to delineate the view proposed here from other, weaker views of agent causality, 
which at first glance speak no less of the agent being the cause of her actions. For example, Clarke (2011) claims 
that the agent is a co-cause besides her reasons; Swinburne (2013) holds that it suffices for agent causality that the 
agent complete the otherwise insufficient physical causes.  
22 Some philosophers have attempted to show that this principle is not a necessary condition for free will (e.g. 
(Frankfurt 1969). I take those attacks to be unsuccessful (cf. Swinburne 2013, ch. 7.6).  
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but that an agent choosing his action is exactly what we want to get at. So we could propose that in 
observations, the mind is causally efficacious but not causally independent, while in actions it is both 
efficacious (regarding the collapse direction) and independent. A possible complaint against this is that 
it sounds ad hoc. After all, the underlying mechanism is the same in both cases, which suggests an equal 
treatment: either the mind is merely causally efficacious in both cases, or it is causally independent in 
both cases. But this disjunction is unsatisfactory, since the first disjunct precludes genuinely free actions, 
and the second disjunct posits an implausible ‘Jedi’ power of choice over what happens in the physical 
world.  
Let’s grant for the sake of argument that the mind can have different causal roles in observation and 
action as outlined above. It then follows that the mind directs the collapses. But doesn’t this run counter 
to quantum theory and physical theory in general? At least not obviously, and not in all respects. 
Remember that we allowed for some theoretical role of consciousness in the first place. Then suppose 
that consciousness is an m-property. Do we know in what manner this m-property brings about 
collapses? We don’t. The collapse process is a ‘black box’ for us. It might as well be that the box contains 
the effects of conscious volitions. One could still object that the introduction of m-properties was meant 
to naturalize consciousness by making it accessible for physico-mathematical theory, and volitions elude 
the grasp of physics and mathematics. But this objection fails to acknowledge that the naturalization of 
consciousness does not annihilate its phenomenal nature; to the contrary, it must preserve it, on pain of 
ceasing to be a theory of phenomenal consciousness. In fact, naturalistic theories of consciousness try 
to model features of phenomenality and often center on the concept of information (see e.g. (Chalmers 
1996; Tononi et al. 2016). Hence, I conclude that claiming causal independence of the mind does not 
violate the spirit of a naturalistic CC theory.  
 
There is one restriction for the causal independence of the mind, however, at least if one wishes to stay 
on safe ground in physical theory: the Born rule. The Born rule is a mathematical postulate that fixes 
the probability of outcomes of measurements of a superposed quantum system, and it is experimentally 
very well confirmed. For example, it follows from the Born rule that an electron in a superposition of 
spin-up and spin-down (relative to a given axis) will with a probability of 0.5 go up or down in a 
magnetic field, respectively; and indeed, doing sufficiently many (say 10,000) measurements with 
prepared electrons yields probabilities of the two possible outcomes close to 0.5 each. If a CC version 
of ID is to respect the Born rule, then the relative frequency of a given type of outcome must converge 
to the value given by the Born rule. For example, if the m-operator has four eigenvalues, the relative 
frequency of each corresponding outcome will converge to 0.25 in case of a uniform superposition (with 
equal weights of the superposed states), or, more generally, to a number depending on its individual 
weight (while the relative frequencies/probabilities must add up to 1). In other words, it is simply not 
possible that, in the long run, a certain action/action type (corresponding to a certain eigenvalue of the 
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m-operator) occurs in 40% of instances of willings23, given a uniform superposition (mutatis mutandis 
for non-uniform superpositions).  
 
How much of a restriction of freedom is this? We should halt here for a moment and realize that we’ve 
reached a crucial point. The Born rule can reasonably be called a law of nature. Thus, if mental causation 
does not respect Born’s rule, a law of nature is violated. We should then in principle be able to detect 
those violations in brains. An independent issue is how to construct the notion of ‘laws of nature’, if 
such violations are possible. I will briefly gesture towards this point in section 6.  
 
But back to the question: how mutilated will freedom come out if mental causation respects the Born 
rule? This will depend on the number of eigenvalues associated with the m-operator in conjunction with 
the possibility of multiple realizability. The more eigenvalues, the more ‘destinations’ there are for a 
collapse process. However, there must also be multiple realizability, that is, a certain action (type) needs 
to be realizable by different brain states (corresponding to different eigenvalues). This is because even 
if there are many possible target states of a collapse process, it should be ensured that a number of them 
(not just one) leads to a desired action; otherwise, volitions and body movements would frequently come 
apart. But those two conditions (multiplicity of m-eigenvalues and multiple realizability) seem to be just 
necessary, not sufficient conditions. After all, a multiplicity of eigenvalues distributed over redundant 
brain states just raises the probability of the desired action being carried out; it does not guarantee it. It 
might still happen, with a certain probability, that I endeavor to raise my arm, but end up with stomping 
my feet. I presume that such aberrations are extremely rare, and that there are good physiological (as 
opposed to quantum mechanical) explanations for them. Therefore, it seems that a CC theory of ID 
cannot afford to allow inherent action failures.  
 
A proposal of how to reconcile free will and CC comes from Henry Stapp, one of the most prolific 
writers on this subject. I cannot do justice to his ample work here, especially because his theory seems 
to have evolved over the years. What I am going to do is draw mainly on his most recent work Quantum 
Theory and Free Will (2017), focusing on the most relevant points for ID.  
Stapp divides the causation of a free action into three processes24. Process 2 is the Schrödinger dynamics, 
process 3 the probabilistic collapse process, and process 1 the mental influence. He conceives of process 
1 as a Y/N question, e.g. “Am I moving my finger?”. The link to the brain as a quantum object consists 
in every volume V of a brain’s state space having a discrete observable with the values Y and N. David 
Bourget (Bourget 2004, 9) succinctly sums up this view as follows: “A measurement of this observable 
for some V yields a positive outcome if the brain is in V and negative otherwise. There should thus be 
 
23 By ‘willing’ (or volition) I mean here the mental state that either constitutes the actual carrying out of the 
(conscious) action or inevitably (physiological failures notwithstanding) leads to the action. In other words, a 
conscious raising of my arm couldn’t happen if I didn’t will it in the sense here under discussion. By contrast, an 
expression of will like in “I want to watch a movie tomorrow night” is not what I mean by ‘willing’.  
24 In his 2017, Stapp speaks of two processes (1 and 2) only. Although this is his most recent advance, it is still 
legitimate to depict him as assuming three processes, since he divides process 2 into two phases (2017, 8). 
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a measurement that can tell us if a brain is in one of the many possible states in which any decision has 
been made.” In other words, in contrast to my suggestion concerning the m-properties account above, 
Stapp is multiplying observables rather than eigenvalues. It is important to note that for Stapp, the two 
pivotal points for free actions are processes 1 and 3. Process 1 determines the ‘question’25, and process 
3 (probabilistically) determines the answer, thereby not – it seems – strictly observing the Born rule. He 
writes: “In the quasi-orthodox theory nature’s choices are not random, hence lacking a sufficient reason 
to be what they are, but are assumed to have sufficient reasons that entail a biasing of nature’s choices 
in favor of choices that advance the personal values of the subjects in these experiments who are posing 
the questions pertaining to matters of interest to themselves.” (2017, 99-100). The (in my view) 
insurmountable difficulties of integrating values into a physical theory notwithstanding, it may well be 
that already at this point, Stapp’s theory breaks the Born rule, something he emphatically excluded in 
earlier writings (e.g., (Stapp 2004)). Be that as it may, on Stapp’s account, each ‘question’ the mind may 
ask in order to trigger an action corresponds to a ‘projection operator’ belonging to an observable26. 
Now, the values of those observables are subject to the Schrödinger evolution (process 2) and thus the 
probabilities of receiving a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ answer, respectively, depend on the point of time of the 
question. Put simply, the probability for a desired answer (Y/N) to a certain question rises to its possible 
maximum (0.5) within a certain time limit (call it TS), only to result in a collapse (without the mind’s 
interference) and re-rise of the probability within the next TS period (see fig. 3). What the mind now 
does, according to Stapp – not, nota bene, collapsing the wave function – is to ‘hold in place’ the collapse 
outcome (in case it was the desired one) via the QZE, for time period Ta.  
 
 
Fig. 3: Process of enforcing a free decision according to Stapp. The vertical axis represents the probability that a collapse to 
the ‘yes’ state occurs upon measurement (here it is assumed that the state is the desired one). Dashed lines mark actual events. 
 
25 According to the most recent version in Stapp 2017. He held this already in his (1999), then intermittently 
retracted it.  
26 „The detailed psychophysical rules that are presumed to fix or determine the projection operator P (which 
defines the empirical question) are not yet known, and I have made no basic commitment concerning the form of 
those rules.“ (Stapp 2004) 
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In the above example, the will sets in at TS and upholds the probability of the desired outcome at ~1. (Own creation after fig. 
3 in Bourget 2004) 
Stapp’s account can be criticized in several ways. First, his conception of ‘mental measurements’ as 
empirical questions is awkward and implausible. Asking a question simply does not seem to be what is 
going on when we will an action (perhaps a case can be made for phenomenal experiences being 
construed as a ‘Q & A game’, but I doubt that). There is no introspective evidence for this claim, and 
simply re-christening volitions as questions won’t do, not least because we can clearly distinguish 
between the mental events of questions and of volitions. But admittedly, not much hinges on how one 
construes the mental events initiating actions; perhaps one could just claim that volitions as directed to 
one outcome are successful only to the extent to which the Born rule allows it. Nothing essential would 
be lost by dropping the ‘Q & A’ talk.  
 
Another, more serious concern is that free actions may have to wait, since ‘nature’s answer’ to an ‘action 
request’ can be negative. This stands in contradiction to our daily experiences. Stapp seeks to evade 
such an obvious discrepancy by making mind-matter-‘communication’ exceedingly rapid; for example, 
he holds that many ‘Nos’ can occur without any passage of time (2017, ch. 2) and that the mind can 
transmit information faster than light (2017, ch. 6 + App. A). I leave to physicists to judge whether all 
this is tenable and whether his rejection of ‘no superluminal transmission’ does not run up against the 
no-signaling theorem27.  
A third objection is that Stapp’s account entails ubiquitous deviations of actions from will. David 
Bourget (2004) argues to this effect. As sketched above, the mental interactions are bound to time frames 
TS. Within one instance of TS, the mind can send a finite number of ‘requests’ for a wave function 
collapse in the desired direction. Bourget assumes that TS should be at most 100 ms, this representing 
the empirically discovered lower threshold for the individuation of complex conscious events ((Varela 
1997); coincides with Libet’s ‘urge’ (Libet et al. 1983; Libet 1999)); and that Ta is in the order of 20 to 
50 ms, this representing the lower threshold for simple conscious events to be perceived as separate in 
time (Kristofferson 1967; Hirsh and Sherrick Jr 1961). Under those assumptions, 2 to 5 attempts of 
doing an action are available per timeframe. With the ex hypothesi stipulation that the probability of the 
desired response is 0.5 at each attempt, we get a probability of between 0.03 (for 5 attempts) and 0.25 
(for 2 attempts) that the desired action fails. It seems clear that even a ratio of 3 failed actions per 100 
are highly implausible. Stapp has replied to this criticism in the following way: “[T]he events in a rapid 
sequence generated by a willful effort are not perceived as separate in time. They all run together, and 
their rapidity is associated with the feeling of effort. I have never found any reason why the temporal 
separation between the events experienced in this run-on way could not be a fraction of 1ms, if their 
rapidity is controlled by conscious effort.” (2004, 7) Apparently, he rejects the construal of single 
 
27 The no-signaling theorem (or no-communication theorem) is a no-go theorem from quantum information theory 
which states that, during measurement of an entangled quantum state, it is not possible for one observer, by making 




conscious efforts as simple conscious events falling under the 20 to 50 ms restriction. Indeed, we 
plausibly don’t experience willful effort as a rapid sequence of events, but Stapp’s analyzing conscious 
effort into many quantum-mechanically relevant single events is currently just a hypothesis in need of 
corroboration. So, the difficulty here may after all not be insurmountable. 
 
The fourth objection is one of two problems of CC having to do with decoherence. Decoherence means 
the leaking of quantum information from a system to its environment, which could only be prevented 
by perfect isolation (including very low temperature). Brains, however, are of course open systems, 
heavily coupled to their environment. In any case, decoherence times in brain structures are short by the 
standard of time frames of our conscious lives (in the order of 10(%!𝑠 or even significantly less, 
depending on the exact structure in question). Whether or not decoherence times constitute a difficulty 
for quantum-aided mental causation will be discussed in section 5.3. Here, we will deal with a different 
problem arising from decoherence. As David Bourget (2004) argues, decohered states can and should 
be thought of as improper mixtures. Improper mixtures are quantum superpositions, albeit without the 
ability to generate interference effects. Thus, the mind could still wield its quantum influence on the 
brain. 
 
There is a significant drawback, however. Decoherence construed this way entails that the brain is 
entangled with a host of external systems and that brain regions relevant for a given action are entangled 
with irrelevant ones. But this means that superposition collapses of brain structures must encompass the 
entangled systems beyond the brain as well. Applied to action, this implies that conscious effort directed 
at a bodily action would have direct consequences for physical structures beyond my body. Proponents 
of telekinesis should not rejoice prematurely, however. After all, a directed manipulation of one part of 
an entangled system via the other part is forbidden by the no-signaling theorem. Also, there doesn’t 
seem to be good evidence for even random influence of mental volitions on physical objects outside the 
body.  
More importantly even, the entanglement of relevant brain areas with irrelevant ones raises the question 
why only the relevant ones (e.g. the SMA28) collapse. This is clearly a problem for accounts like Stapp’s 
that construe NCC as specific brain areas, but even if one went for a neurologically more unspecific 
PCC, the difficulty might persist. In the m-property framework, even if an m-property is not a neural 
property, its causal role will ultimately bring about the collapse of neurons that trigger actions. It seems 
we are again faced with an unpleasant dilemma: either (if this is physically tenable) one construes 
decoherence as the complete loss of superposition and thus runs into the problem of far too short 
decoherence times; or one preserves the superposition character, only to face the problem of undesirable 
entanglements. This dilemma seems to be a problem for CC accounts in general. 
 
 
28 Supplementary motor area 
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4.4 Summary of conceptual problems for CC 
We have seen that in order to evade the mysteriousness objection, CC needs to be made physically 
rigorous. I presented a way how this could be done, inspired by Chalmers’s and McQueen’s theory. The 
QZD seems tractable, but two other problems are more severe. First, the Born rule stands like a monolith 
against all attempts to make CC compatible with libertarian free will. A solution of this problem requires 
at minimum a theory of laws of nature that adequately accommodates the required violations. Second, 
there is the problem of undesired entanglements, a problem specifically created by Stapp’s theory which 
sets out to reconcile quantum theory with free will.  
At this point, one may legitimately ask why QM should be invoked at all. Note that above difficulties 
arise if one takes into account all aspects of QM, and not just the ones (seemingly) conducive to one’s 
theory. Since the those problems also pertain to the ‘classical’ version of CC (designed to explain 
definite conscious experiences), one may well ask if one should not look for a better QM interpretation, 
quite independently of ID. In conjunction with the possible failure regarding conserved quantities, the 
list of motivations for CC grows thin. For CC in the service of ID, at any rate, there are also empirical 
problems beside the conceptual ones. We will look at some of them in the next section. 
5. Empirical problems 
5.1 Energy-time uncertainty doesn’t leave enough leeway 
In one of the first serious attempts to show that QM-aided ID is viable, Beck & Eccles (1992) calculated 
that an object as heavy as six hydrogen masses could be moved by the mind within the confines of the 
momentum-position uncertainty relation. As indicated in section 3, there are several positions as to what 
the uncertainty relation actually describes; but let us, arguendo, assume that it captures an actual, 
ontological indeterminacy. 
  
Eccles’s and Beck’s calculation is based on the equations of the quantum mechanical zero-point energy 𝐸) and the thermal energy 𝐸*+ of the model system. The idea is that if 𝐸) ≫ 𝐸*+, the particle is in the 
‘quantal regime’ (with quantum effects dominating over classical effects), while it is in the ‘thermal 
regime’ (with classical effects preponderating) if 𝐸*+ ≫ 𝐸); finding the borderline between both regimes 
would then be tantamount to obtaining the critical mass a particle can maximally have while falling 
under the quantal regime. With 𝑇 = 300𝐾, ∆𝑞 ≅ 1	Å the borderline equation 𝐸) = 𝐸*+ yields a critical 
mass of 𝑚, ≅ 6𝑚-. And indeed, if the mind could shift around a particle that heavy without violating 
energy conservation, this would support ID. However, as we’ve seen above, energy-momentum 
conservation is not guaranteed in this case. Furthermore, Wilson (1999) has contested Eccles’ and 
Beck’s claims. His calculations, based on the time-energy uncertainty relation, yield a time period during 
which the breaking of one single hydrogen bond could go undetected29 of ∆𝑡 < 3.2 × 10(%.𝑠 – much 
too short for any relevant neurophysiological process (like ions passing through a channel) to happen. 
 
29 No matter what further ontological conclusions one draws from the uncertainty relation, it is clear that it denotes 
a limit of detectability.  
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(Those processes are rather in the order of milliseconds (10(/𝑠)). Conversely, if one picked a reasonable 
(though conservative) time period like 10	𝑚𝑠, one ends up with an ‘energy leeway’ of 5.2 ∗ 10(/)𝐽, 
which is 200,000 times smaller than a Van der Waals bond and thus much too little (see (P. G. H. Clarke 
2014)).  
Beck (1996) has presented a slightly enhanced account, where he holds on to the 1992 result but 
additionally calculates a signal time for quantal processes of about 30 ∗ 10(%!𝑠, which comes relatively 
close to Wilson’s result, and is well in the order of recent calculations of ion decoherence times in 
protein channels (V. Salari et al. 2011; Summhammer, Salari, and Bernroider 2012; Salari et al. 2015; 
Summhammer, Sulyok, and Bernroider 2018). In fact, the just-cited 2012, 2015 and 2018 papers even 
argue that decoherence times in the order of picoseconds are beneficial for ion transmission through 
protein pores, and that the transmission dynamics could not be explained without recourse to a quantum 
model of ions. (The import of this for dualistic mental causation will be discussed in section 5.3). All in 
all, it seems that Wilson’s result stands on firmer ground. Apart from the uncertainty equation, he uses 
only one quite conservative assumption (one hydrogen bond30), while Eccles and Beck work with the 
additional notions of thermal and quantal regime. I’ll leave the final verdict to the physicists. Perhaps, 
one more plus on Wilson’s side is that his equation directly targets the more relevant quantity of energy 
(momentum isn’t conserved either way). At any rate, what can be said about Eccles’ and Beck’s proposal 
is that it is not watertight. 
  
Recently, Georgiev and Glazebrook (Georgiev and Glazebrook 2014) have undertaken an attempt to 
salvage Eccles’s and Beck’s basic idea. By their time, it was already established knowledge that 
vesicular release of neurotransmitters into the synaptic cleft is an exocytotic, protein-mediated process 
(Jahn and Fasshauer 2012) - not the product of the state change of a metastable paracrystalline vesicular 
grid, as Eccles (Beck and Eccles 1992; Eccles 1994) assumed. The main protein complex involved in 
vesicular exocytosis is called the SNARE complex. Glazebrook and Georgiev hypothesize that a ‘quasi-
quantum particle’ – a soliton – might propagate along the 4-alpha-helix-bundle of the SNARE complex 
and thus trigger exocytosis which is foundational for neuron firing. The posited soliton is assumed to 
have 5% hydrogen mass, which would allow it to tunnel through potential barriers of 1-2 nm width, 
which seems to correspond well with the conformational situation in a SNARE complex. As support for 
their hypothesis, they offer three arguments: 
• Solitons are not a quixotic idiosyncrasy of theirs. A so-called Davydov soliton (Davydov 1973; 
1977) has been posited as an explanation for the actin-myosin interactions in muscles.  
• Their model is temperature-dependent, which is also true of SNARE proteins. The model thus 
looks more realistic than electron tunneling (apparently proposed by Beck 1996) which is 
temperature-independent. 
 
30 The smaller the energy, the larger the time interval. One could replace the hydrogen bond with an even weaker 
bond type, the Van der Waals force, which has a bonding energy of 0,5-5 kJ/mol (H bond: 20 kJ/mol). But this 
would increase the time frame by 4 to 40 times, which is still by far not enough.  
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• Glazebrook and Georgiev claim that ‘vibrationally assisted tunneling’ (under which the soliton 
action would fall) “has been experimentally proven for the action of a number of enzymes with 
dehydrogenase activity” (Glazebrook & Georgiev 2014, 20). 
• The hypothesis is experimentally testable: replacing hydrogen atoms in SNARE proteins with 
deuterium atoms31 should have a clear effect on the probability of synaptic vesicle release. 
This certainly looks like an interesting approach. Further work is needed to make the soliton hypothesis 
more robust; as of now, it is not much more than speculation. At any rate, even if this succeeds, the other 
problems with quantum theory outlined above remain. But perhaps, after all, what we need is just a 
locus in the brain where gentle, possibly undetectable interactions can take place, and quantum theory 
with its restrictions and strict formalism is more ballast than help.  
 
5.2 Amplification of quantum effects is doubtful 
As we’ve seen, the uncertainty relations allow (if anything) only for effects which by themselves seem 
much too weak to make any difference in the brain. It has been suggested, therefore, that those tiny leaps 
might be amplified by (deterministic!) chaos in the brain (Hobbs 1991; King 1991; Hong 2003; Kane 
1996). In fact, there is little doubt that chaotic behavior actually occurs in the brain (Korn and Faure 
2003; Tsuda and Fujii 2007; Battaglia and Hansel 2011). There are, however, some major problems 
with the combination of quantum events and chaos. 
 
First, the very existence of ‘quantum chaos’ is doubtful (Bishop 2008).This has to do with the 
Schrödinger equation, which mathematically predicts ‘quantum suppression of chaos’ (Hobbs 1991; 
Koperski 2000). A more general problem is that (in fact irrespective of the means of amplification) one 
needs to be able to specify precise initial conditions. At least on some interpretations of QM (in 
particular, the very collapse theories under discussion here), the notion of precise pre-measurement 
conditions is void of meaning. Third, a chaos-amplified quantum-ID would have to translate the directed 
collapses (whose plausibility is debatable, see above) at the quantum level into macroscopic effects – 
whether this is plausible is at least unclear. Fourth, the noise-resistance of the brain constitutes a further 
difficulty. Brain cells, like cells in general, are quite resistant to thermal fluctuations, which are about 
one billion times stronger than quantum fluctuations (Clarke 2014, 115). Hence, a fortiori brain cells 
should be resistant to quantum fluctuations. If, by contrast, they’re not, it then seems that thermal 
fluctuations will be amplified as well, something we do not observe. The solution is of course to posit 
low-energy quantum events in rapid succession (like (Beck 1996; 2001; 2008)), a proposal whose 
problems we have already seen. 
 
 
31 Deuterium ( 𝐻!" ) is a heavy isotope of hydrogen ( 𝐻!! ). 
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5.3 Do we have empirical evidence for relevant quantum effects in the brain? 
Of course, all conceptual investigations of CC-ID are fruitless if there empirically are no relevant 
quantum events in the brain which the mind could make use of. In many fields of biology, the existence 
of a host of quantum effects, ranging from bacteria through the animal kingdom to the human retina (see 
(Jedlicka 2017; Al-Khalili and McFadden 2015; Gehlert 2019)), has been proven. This raises the prior 
probability of their occurrence in human brains. But do we have evidence for them? 
 
One central issue in this context are decoherence times. If they are too short for a given biological 
structure in the brain, quantum effects seem be drowned in thermal noise and doomed to irrelevance. 
For about ten years, Max Tegmark’s (2000) calculations concerning ion transmission through the cell 
membrane and microtubules were taken to be decisive. He arrived at decoherence times of 10(!)	𝑠 to 10(%/	𝑠, which is thought to be far too short to make any difference to neuronal function. However, in 
the past decade, some new simulation studies (esp. Summhammer, Salari, and Bernroider 2012; Salari 
et al. 2015; Summhammer, Sulyok, and Bernroider 2018) suggest that (1) decoherence times for ions in 
protein channels are shorter (in the order of 10(%!	𝑠), that (2) a quantum-mechanical behavior as well 
as quick decoherence are even beneficial for ion conduction through channels, to the extent that 
conduction dynamics could hardly be explained without those factors, and that (3) the quantum model 
even explains the selectivity (at high throughput!) of the channel. 
 
Remains the question what to make of this. First and foremost, the model speaks of decoherence, not of 
collapse; these are different things. Perhaps, in so far as collapse entails decoherence, mind-induced 
wave function collapse is what accounts for decoherence. Second, the model is about a K+ pore in 
bacterial cells, not in human neurons, so applicability to human Na+/K+ pumps would have to be shown. 
Third, even if the model could be transferred to human neurons, it is not clear where mental action 
should set in. At the level of the ion wave packet? This seems unnecessary, since according to the model, 
the ion ‘sneaks’ through the channel (Summhammer, Sulyok, and Bernroider 2018, 9) and ‘needs no 
further help’. At the level of ion velocity, thereby increasing the portion of ions with sufficient kinetic 
energy? This is not only completely independent from the channeling model, but also re-imports the 
issue of energy conservation. At the level of the protein (constituents)? On the one hand, the ion quantum 
dynamics seem sufficient to explain their passage through the tunnel, and on the other hand, the 
plausibility of mental manipulation decreases with the size of the objects. Perhaps influencing single 
oxygen atoms (as in Summhammer et al.’s model) will suffice, but that is presently just speculation. 
All in all, the recent advances in quantum biochemistry have raised the plausibility of quantum effects 
in the brain, but likewise left dualists will little to make of it: in an ‘in-out’ superposition setting (as in 
Tegmark 2000 and Beck and Eccles 1992), the mind can influence the outcome probability in one 
direction (problems with the Born rule notwithstanding). In the recent ‘quantum tunneling’ model, the 
ions basically help themselves, and no mental influence seems possible without betraying the very 
motivation of CC-ID.  
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6. Why no-collapse interpretations of QM don’t help, and what the real issue is 
I think by now it should be clear that CC does not give the interactive dualist a ‘free lunch’, but, to the 
contrary, creates more problems than it solves. One might ask whether other no-collapse interpretations 
of QM are of any help. It should be noted from the outset that they lack the collapse process interactive 
dualists have put their hopes in, since it appeared to leave some ‘gaps’ in nature the mind could fill. 
However, as we’ve seen, on closer inspection, CC-ID faces the issues of non-conserved quantities and 
the Born rule, issues that no-collapse interpretations do not even pretend to avoid. In fact, an important 
no-collapse theory (Bohmian mechanics/BM) makes quantum dynamics wholly deterministic32 and thus 
offers no more help to ID than classical mechanics. And that is not all: two other important no-collapse 
interpretations – the Many Minds Theory (Albert and Loewer 1988) and the Many Worlds Theory 
(Everett 1957) – require quite extravagant ontologies. I have no space here to treat those approaches 
adequately, but it is to be expected that they make life for the dualist harder, if anything. 
 
I conclude that the real problem an interactive dualist needs to solve is how to reconcile his view of 
mental causation with laws of nature. For example, does it make sense to claim that the Born rule holds 
in all physical systems except those that undergo mental influence? If physical dynamics should turn 
out to be wholly deterministic, how do construe mental interaction be construed at all, without violating 
laws of nature? And even if dynamics were (partly) probabilistic, it seems that one needs to ‘choose 
one’s poison’: either make ID laws-complying and bite the bullet of giving up on libertarian freedom or 
accept that probabilistic laws fail where minds intervene. So, the real question is how we should construe 
laws of nature in a way that gives both physics and mental causation their due. This is where interactive 
dualists should put their efforts.  
  
 
32 There is a probabilistic element in BM, but it is located in the initial conditions of particles. The dynamics of 
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